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With the current expansion of data linkage research, the challenge is to ﬁnd the balance between preserving
theprivacyofperson-leveldatawhilstmaking thesedataaccessible foruse totheir fullpotential.Wedescribea
privacy-protecting safe haven and secure remote access system, referred to as the Secure Anonymised Infor-
mation Linkage (SAIL)Gateway. TheGatewayprovides data userswith a familiarWindows interface and their
usual toolsets to access approved anonymously-linked datasets for research and evaluation. We outline the
principles and operatingmodel of theGateway, the features provided touserswithin the secure environment,
andhowweare approaching the challengesofmakingdata safely accessible to increasingnumbersof research
users. The Gateway represents a powerful analytical environment and has been designed to be scalable and
adaptable to meet the needs of the rapidly growing data linkage community.
 2014 The Aurthors. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. This is an open access article under
the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction and the public. However, there are competing challenges that haveAs many countries worldwide increasingly move towards elec-
tronically-held records across the range of public services, there is
a growing potential for rich and novel studies through the record-
level linkage of these administrative data. This is commonly re-
ferred to as data linkage, that is, merging two or more separate
datasets containing information about the same individuals so that
their topic areas can be studied together (e.g. hospital admissions
and education). Indeed, many are of the view that we have a duty
to re-use the wealth of data that are routinely collected as part of
healthcare (and other public service) delivery to beneﬁt patientsto be addressed, namely, how to ensure that individual privacy is
protected whilst making the data as accessible as possible.
Although some countries have linkable population-based health
and social welfare registers [1], large-scale data linkage research
is still a fairly novel area with relatively few long-established units,
such as those in Australia [2], Canada [3,4], Scotland [5], England
[6], as well as the Secure Anonymous Information Linkage System
(SAIL) system inWales [7]. However, it is an area that is developing
rapidly with existing work being extended and new units being
created. For example, the data linkage infrastructure is being ex-
tended across Australia [8], and four new Centres have been estab-
lished in the UK: two in England, one in Scotland and one in Wales,
creating the Farr Health Informatics Research Institute [9]. Among
these is the Centre for the Improvement of Population Health
through E-records Research (CIPHER) [10], based in Swansea
(Wales), which is underpinned by the work of the SAIL system
and aims to open up new opportunities to increase collaboration
in data linkage research.
1.1. Motivation
The SAIL system was established in 2006 and, by using a range
of technical and procedural privacy-protecting techniques, has
brought together a wealth of health-related routinely-collected
datasets in Wales, so that they can be reliably and anonymously
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decision to establish the SAIL system as a repository with a central
architecture, was made because of a number of factors. Among the
major of these were that: many of the existing IT systems in health
and social care settings were old and some were unstable; identity
management, anonymisation and record-linkage would have been
more problematic if attempting to operate in real time; there were
unknown issues relating to data quality; there were varying de-
grees of organisational readiness and resources; and, it was more
acceptable to Data Providers (DPs) to provide their anonymous
data to SAIL, than for SAIL to plug into their systems and extract
data as required. Further considerations were timeliness, comput-
ing capacity and cost [7].
There are various risks and attack models that need to be miti-
gated and controlled for in working with large-scale person-based
data linkage in a repositorymodel. It is essential that data are trans-
ported securely to avoid the risk of data loss or data falling into the
hands of parties not authorised to receive them. A reliable and con-
sistent matching technique is needful to ensure data accuracy,
without which researchers could not have conﬁdence in the data.
Even though the data are anonymised, someone with legitimate ac-
cess to the data, or a potential intruder, may attempt to re-identify
individuals or clinicians. It is essential, therefore, that anonymisa-
tion is robust, that measures to further encrypt key variables are
in place, and that data presented can be limited to the needs of a gi-
ven project. As well as this, researchers need to understand their
responsibilities and agree to abide by them. Furthermore, research
outputs need to be scrutinised before dissemination to mitigate the
risk of re-identiﬁcation due to rare events or conditions. The data-
base and analysis environment need to be secured against intruders
and inappropriate data access. External scrutiny of the whole sys-
tem is valuable for veriﬁcation of compliance with Information
Governance, for recommendations for improvement and to pro-
mote public and DP conﬁdence.
Thus the SAIL objectives are: (1) ensuring data transportation
is secure; (2) operating a reliable record matching technique to
enable accurate record linkage across datasets; (3) anonymising
and encrypting elements of the data to minimise the risk of re-
identiﬁcation; (4) applying measures to address disclosure risk
in data views created for researchers; (5) ensuring data access
is controlled and authorised; (6) scrutinising proposals for data
utilisation and approving output; and (7) gaining external veriﬁ-
cation of compliance with Information Governance. These objec-
tives still hold and their principles have been described
previously [7,11], but there have been some important recent ad-
vances, the most notable being the way in which data are ac-
cessed. The SAIL model has always been to make data available
to view, but not to remove; data are not passed outside of the
system to researchers unless informed participant consent has
been obtained. This is an important safeguard against linkage at-
tack as it means researchers cannot take the data and link it with
publicly available information to attempt to re-identify individu-
als. However, in the early years, approved researchers were only
able to access data views via dedicated, secure, on-site terminals.
This had practical disadvantages and limited the number of con-
current data users due to space constraints and travel require-
ments. The increasing numbers of researchers wishing to make
use of SAIL data, from as far aﬁeld as Australia [12], made it
impractical to continue with an on-site only data access model.
This led to the development of the SAIL Gateway which is a re-
mote data access system and analysis environment, as a powerful
means of providing greater access to data without compromising
individual privacy. This case study describes the main recent ad-
vances that have been made in the SAIL system for the curation,
management and re-use of health-related data, with particular fo-
cus on the SAIL Gateway.1.2. Paper organisation
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: We brieﬂy
summarise the high-level architecture of the SAIL system for com-
pleteness, and to highlight recent developments against the SAIL
objectives since the system was ﬁrst described [7]. We then set
out the principles on which the SAIL Gateway was developed,
and use these to describe its operating model, the analysis environ-
ment, how ﬁle trafﬁc in and out of the Gateway is managed, and
plans for future scalability. We illustrate the user interface and
set out the data user journey with the stages to be followed when
engaging with SAIL. We discuss SAIL in context and describe how it
can enable data linkage research to be carried out effectively and
securely in a ‘positive-sum’ approach: that is, aiming to optimise
the balance between data security and data utility [13]. As part
of this, we incorporate discussion on the challenges we have
encountered, and plans for improvement. We note that we some-
times use the terms ‘researcher’ and ‘data user’ interchangeably,
whilst acknowledging that not all uses of the data are research.1.3. Relevance to special issue on informatics methods in medical
privacy
The special issue focuses on informatics methods in medical
privacy: healthcare information collection and communication,
healthcare data and knowledge management, healthcare informa-
tion systems and technologies, and healthcare policies. Within
these themes there are articles on research, practical applications,
critical analyses and position papers. With its focus on practical
applications for a privacy-preserving infrastructure and healthcare
data management, we believe this article on the SAIL Gateway and
its associated methodologies is highly relevant to the special issue.2. Sail system architecture
The high-level architecture of the SAIL system is illustrated in
Fig. 1. SAIL uses formal data sharing agreements with DPs and sup-
ports them in their due diligence processes to provide datasets to
SAIL in accordance with Information Governance. The SAIL techni-
cal team provides guidance to the DP on the ﬁle extract speciﬁca-
tion and this uses a split-ﬁle approach to enact the separation
principle. The deﬁning feature of this principle is that the com-
monly-recognised identiﬁers, and other ﬁelds used in the matching
process, (consisting of name, address, postal code, gender and date
of birth (designated File 1)) are separated from the clinical or
event-based descriptive data (such as disease codes and prescrip-
tions (designated File 2)). A distinction is made between the two
types of data to reﬂect the varying potential for direct (File 1) or
indirect (File 2) attribution of variables to an identity, and so that
the required variables can be used in the matching process, with-
out the associated descriptive data being present. File 1 is sent to
the NHS Wales Informatics Service (NWIS) [14] which acts as a
Trusted Third Party (TTP), and File 2 is sent directly to SAIL. There
are two methods of data transportation: ﬁle upload using a secure
electronic transfer facility (known as the NHS switching service);
or if the DP has a secure ﬁle download service, SAIL and NWIS
can make use of this. In the past SAIL also used portable data trans-
fer media, such as CDs, but we no longer allow this for improved
security.
NWIS carries out matching and anonymisation, whereby the
commonly-recognised identiﬁers are replaced with an Anonymous
Linking Field (ALF) assigned uniquely to each person represented
in the File 1 dataset, along with minimal demographics to create
File 3. Matching is carried out against the Welsh Demographic Ser-
vice, an administrative register of people in Wales registered with
Fig. 1. SAIL architecture. This diagram shows the SAIL databank system and the
controls in place for data acquisition and utilisation, with an indication of the roles
carried out by each party. Beginning at the base of the diagram, SAIL has formal
agreements with data providers to provide their data to the databank in accordance
with Information Governance. The commonly-recognised identiﬁers are anony-
mised at NWIS, who provide a trusted third party service to SAIL. Further processes
of masking and encryption are carried out at SAIL, and the SAIL databank is
constructed. From the top of the diagram, requests to use the data are reviewed by
SAIL and an independent Information Governance Review Panel (IGRP) to assess
compliance with Information Governance before access can be allowed. Once this is
agreed, a data view is created by SAIL staff, and access to this view can be made
available via the SAIL Gateway. For this to happen, further data transformations are
carried out to control the risk of disclosure, and the data user signs an access
agreement for responsible data utilisation, in accordance the speciﬁcations of the
IGRP to comply with Information Governance.
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graphic database [7,11]. The ALF is a unique number, based on
the person’s National Health Service (NHS) number, encrypted
using a Blowﬁsh algorithm [15]. The minimal demographics con-
sist of week of birth (in place of date of birth), a simple code for
gender, and Lower Super Output Area (LSOA, approximately 1500
population) of residence in place of postal code. File 3 is then sent
to SAIL for recombination with File 2 to create an anonymous ver-
sion of the original dataset [7]. The minimal demographics and
their granularities were decided upon based on the balance of data
security and data utility. Having these variables associated with
the descriptive data within SAIL means that important issues such
as gender, age, birth seasonality, and area of residence can be stud-
ied in relation to health, without revealing identity.
Advances in work with geographic data have enabled a parallel
process to be developed for address-level datasets. In this way, a
unique Residential Anonymous Linking Field (RALF) is assigned
to each address in the File 1R dataset, similarly creating File 3R
which can be recombined with the corresponding event-based
dataset (File 2) at SAIL. An example of this sort of dataset is local
authority housing characteristics. Through the technologies that
have been developed we are able to associate a RALF with the ALFs
within it, so that the health of individuals in relation to their living
environment can be studied. However, great care must be taken so
that individual privacy is not compromised. This is because of the
possibility of being able to work out the location of a given prop-
erty in certain scenarios. For example, the density of housing in a
rural area is often considerably lower than in an urban setting. This
could possibly lead to re-identiﬁcation of individuals living within
a given house and, therefore, it is essential to have robust methodsto ensure privacy is protected when working with residence-based
data [16,17].
Further processes of masking and encryption are carried out at
SAIL, for example: the ALF is encrypted to create an ALF-E (En-
crypted), to ensure that no one accessing the data (whether at SAIL
or at NWIS) can decrypt the ﬁeld; and codes pertaining to individ-
ual clinics or General Practices are masked to respect professional
identities. Subject to quality assurance, the dataset is incorporated
into the SAIL databank. The SAIL databank operates on a DB2 plat-
form (Data Warehouse Edition on Advanced Interactive eXecutive
(AIX)) running on an IBM ‘P’ series computer: DeepBlue-C.
SAIL has created a management system, referred to as SAIL Info
Central. This is used by SAIL staff to manage dataset information
and researcher access. It also has a data user interface, and this is
described in Section 4. Requests to use the data are initially re-
viewed by members of the SAIL team to assess feasibility. This en-
tails assessing whether the requested data and variables are
available, and whether the work can be completed within the pro-
posed timescale and resource allocation. It is then reviewed by an
independent Information Governance Review Panel (IGRP) to as-
sess compliance with Information Governance before data access
can be agreed [7]. Some DPs request the right to review proposals
seeking to use their data, and SAIL complies with this requirement.
The IGRP is comprised of members of professional and regulatory
bodies, and we have recently increased the lay representation, such
that it now includes two members of the SAIL Consumer Panel,
which was established in 2011 [18]. The IGRP provides feedback
on the appropriateness of the proposal to the public interest, and
highlights any perceived risks in linking the requested data. This
information is used by the SAIL team to guide data view prepara-
tion. As well as disclosure measures applied at a databank level
(such as masking of practitioner codes) SAIL uses a variety of mea-
sures for risk mitigation in data views created for researchers.
These can be tailored to the needs of the speciﬁc project and in-
clude: aggregation and suppression; limiting numbers of variables
provided/sequential provision; and project-speciﬁc encryption of
the ALF-E to prevent cross-linkage where data users are involved
in multiple projects. This is carried out with dialogue between
the researcher and a senior analyst to ensure that data utility
and security are optimised. The data view is then made available
within a speciﬁed schema, beyond which the researcher has no ac-
cess. However, with the increase in numbers of people wishing to
use SAIL data, this can be an onerous task and we are looking to de-
velop a more automated process.
Once approval is granted, a data view is created, and access to
this view can be provided, subject to the researcher signing a data
access agreement for responsible data utilisation and understand-
ing that misconduct will be subject to disciplinary action. Data ac-
cess can only occur via the SAIL Gateway and this is discussed in
more detail below.3. SAIL Gateway principles
The SAIL Gateway has been created on four basic principles to
ensure that it is able to meet the needs of the growing data linkage
community [8,9], and these are to:
(A) Operate a remote access system that provides secure data
access to approved users.
(B) Host an environment that provides a powerful platform for
data analysis activities.
(C) Have a robust mechanism for the safe transfer of approved
ﬁles in and out of the system.
(D) Ensure that the system is efﬁcient and scalable to accommo-
date a growing data user base.
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4.1. SAIL Gateway operating model
The operating model of the SAIL Gateway, that is how it oper-
ates to accomplish its function, is represented in Fig. 2. SAIL data
are stored on DB2 nodes with controls at various levels of the mod-
el to ensure that only approved personnel are able to access the
data for speciﬁed purposes. Only highly-trusted, on-site technical
staff have direct access to the raw data, and this is for data curation
and management purposes. Even so, no one at SAIL has access to
identiﬁable data due to the File 1/File 2 separation principle and
anonymisation of File 1 at NWIS. All staff accessing data, for what-
ever purpose, are required to abide by the data access agreement
for responsible data use. The Gateway has a range of security mea-
sures, and these include ﬁrewalls, two-factor authentication meth-
ods, encrypted network connections, and security servers.
Approved data users are able to access their data view remotely
via their own computer. To be able do this, data users are provided
with an account to log onto the Gateway via a Virtual Private Net-
work (VPN) and a YubiKey authentication token which, when
placed in the USB slot, conveys a one-time password as if it was en-
tered via the keyboard [19]. The user is then able to access a pro-
visioned remote desktop as the only route to access the data
view. The Gateway system uses Active Directory group policies
to control the conﬁguration of the remote desktop, and users are
prevented from copying or transferring the data, or mapping net-
work drives by these functions being disabled. Further safeguards
are provided by user-level logging of all SQL commands issued
(including by off-site users). This is enabled via the audit feature
on DB2 so that all activity is recorded and tracked, including logins
(successful and attempted), all queries sent to the database, and all
objects (tables or views) accessed by the data user. This is useful
for monitoring system efﬁciency and also to track suspected in-
stances of misconduct.4.2. SAIL Gateway analysis environment
There are many features that comprise the SAIL Gateway anal-
ysis environment. The user interface has been designed to provide
data users with a familiar Windows environment and to host anFig. 2. The SAIL Gateway. The SAIL Gateway is a remote data access system, and this
computer. Once approved with an account, data users are provided with a Gateway desk
desktop protocol (RDP) interposed by a Gateway security server. The Gateway desktop
speciﬁed data view. Within the Gateway LAN, data users have access to analysis tools, a
are mediated by a guardian.array of toolsets and applications so that it forms a ﬂexible re-
search platform. A version of SAIL Info Central is made available
externally to the SAIL Gateway but subject to having a Gateway ac-
count (Fig. 3), and this provides data users with information about
datasets, support options and the services available to them. The
main features available within the SAIL Gateway are illustrated
in Fig. 4. There is a WIKI [20] which acts as a central point of infor-
mation on dataset dictionaries, training materials, best practice
guidelines, tips on data querying, and FAQs. It also signposts data
users to an instant messaging system [21] for rapid communica-
tion between logged-in analysts and to a discussion forum [22]
for Questions and Answers. Data users have access to an NHS Clin-
ical Terminology Browser which enables them to search for read
codes and their meanings to assist them in formulating SQL que-
ries. SQL scripts are developed in an IBM InfoSphere environment,
and querying tools and commonly used applications, such as MS
Ofﬁce, SPSS, R and STATA, are included as standard; but users
can also request the addition of speciﬁc applications for which they
hold a licence. Computationally heavy tasks are usually carried out
via SQL querying of DB2 on DeepBlue-C, whereas less demanding
requirements can be met by the applications running on the re-
mote desktop. As well as this, data users can request permission
to import non-data ﬁles, such as syntax scripts and reference doc-
uments to support their analysis and meet their particular needs.
Data users also have access to SAIL Info Central inside the Gateway.
4.3. SAIL Gateway ﬁle transfers
Even though the data within SAIL are anonymous, the standard
operating model is that row-level data are not permitted to leave
SAIL, except when all relevant regulatory and governance approv-
als, including appropriate participant informed consent, have been
obtained. This principle is an acknowledgement of the potential
risk of disclosure that may be posed by the release, particularly,
of multi-variable data. When a data user has completed their anal-
ysis they are not able to remove their results from the Gateway, as
this can only be done by a SAIL data guardian. The role of the
guardian is carried out by a trusted senior analyst who manually
scrutinises the proposed outputs to ensure that the risk of disclo-
sure has been mitigated. For example, in line with Ofﬁce of Na-
tional Statistics guidance for administrative data, no outputs
should contain row-level data or table cell counts less than 5, butsimpliﬁed illustration shows how data are accessed by end users using their own
top within the Gateway Local Area Network (LAN), and this is accessed via remote
communicates with the SAIL database in the SAIL LAN to provide data users with a
secure ﬁle store and other resources. File transfers into and out of the Gateway LAN
Fig. 3. SAIL Info Central screenshot. This screenshot displays the home page for a data user on the SAIL Info Central (External to the SAIL Gateway) site. The top section
displays menus to more information about the datasets and support options. The top left hand section displays information about the user, which is editable by the user. The
bottom left hand section displays the services available to the user and indicates service status. The centre section displays all the projects that the user is authorised to access
and the hyperlink directs them to more information about the project. The bottom right hand section display a timeline of news feed from projects and dataset updates.
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process can be labour-intensive and we are developing more auto-
mated processes to reduce demand on staff time. As well as using
core SAIL datasets, data users are also able to request that addi-
tional datasets, such as those collected in a research study, are up-
loaded to the system and anonymously linked to existing data
within SAIL. These are subject to our standard quality assurance
procedures scrutiny to ensure privacy is protected [7].
4.4. SAIL Gateway efﬁciency and scalability
SAIL beneﬁts from high performance computing infrastructure
to store and manage the data, currently comprising over 4 billion
rows relating to approximately 4 million historical and current res-
idents of Wales. This requires a substantial commitment to infra-
structure and its management, but it ensures there are no
constraints in storage capacity and efﬁciency of data processing.
A recent in-house efﬁciency audit showed that the average execu-
tion time for SQL queries constructed by data users is less than
30 s. To date over 100 projects have been approved to use SAIL data
with further applications in progress. These have included clinical
trials, disease registers, cohorts, and observational, epidemiological
and methodological studies. Some examples are illustrated brieﬂy
here. The SAFER (Support and Assessment for Fall Emergency
Referrals) studies are a series of trials designed to improve assess-
ment and referral of people who fall. They use routine data in con-
junction with data collected in the studies [24]. The UK Multiple
Sclerosis (MS) Register has an innovative model combining data
from NHS Neurology clinics, routine sources and directly from peo-
ple with MS in the form of Patient Reported Outcome Measures
[25–28]. A similar model has been used by the Ankylosing Spondy-
litis cohort study [29]. The Housing Regeneration and Health studyis using local authority housing data with SAIL data to assess
whether improvements in social housing lead to tangible health
beneﬁts [30]. Various other projects make use of the array of SAIL
datasets without incorporating additional data. Among these are a
study on the risk of gastro-intestinal infections in connection with
the use of proton-pump inhibitors [31], and others on methods to
enhance selection of trial participants [32,33]. None of these pro-
jects would have been practicable without a data linkage
infrastructure.
There are currently 75 remote desktops and, due to increasing
demand, we aim to increase this to support over 300 remote desk-
tops in the next 2 years, but more could be supported if required.
This will require us to continually review and improve the efﬁ-
ciency of our processes. Although SAIL was primarily established
to hold Welsh datasets, the principles are applicable to datasets
from other sources for researchers wishing to use the Gateway
environment as a Safe Haven and analysis platform. Speciﬁc adap-
tations can be made to meet other speciﬁcations, such as the se-
cure data lab approach for particularly sensitive data. This entails
setting up a ‘safe room’ with stringent and strictly controlled data
access conditions, and is a method used by organisations such as
ONS and the UK Data Service [21,34].
A ﬂowchart illustrating the data user’s journey is shown in
Fig. 5. A prospective data user makes contact with the SAIL team
and sets out their proposal for IGRP review. Following approval
and the creation of the user account and data view, the data user
is able to conduct their analysis within the SAIL Gateway environ-
ment. Results are scrutinised before release of the approved out-
puts for dissemination.
Information on the management structures in place for the SAIL
system, providing data to SAIL, using SAIL data and summaries of
the research portfolio and outputs, can be found on the SAIL
Fig. 4. SAIL Gateway screenshot. This screenshot displays the main features available within the SAIL Gateway. The left hand side displays the desktop icons to software that
is installed as default. Starting from the top and working clockwise the screenshot displays the internet based resources – Question and Answer Forum, Frequently Asked
Questions, SAIL Info Central (Internal to the SAIL Gateway), and the SAIL GatewayWIKI. The second screen displays the IBM InfoSphere environment used to develop SQL code
to manipulate SAIL data to be research ready. The third screen displays the NHS Clinical Terminology Browser which enables users to search for read codes and their
meanings. Finally the last two screens display the instant messaging system that enables users to communicate and share information within the secure SAIL Gateway
environment.
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subject to a rolling programme of independent audit. This is valu-
able in such a demanding ﬁeld as it provides us with recommenda-
tions for improvement, and then the assurance provided by the
audit reports can be conveyed to stakeholders. We are currently
working towards ISO 27001 compliance to further increase robust-
ness and stakeholder conﬁdence. This is an extensive process
requiring considerable time and effort from the SAIL team, but it
is a valuable exercise to ensure that we operate to the highest
standards.
The main principles of SAIL methodologies are summarised in
Table 1 and the importance of recent developments, the most nota-
ble changes being due to the development of the SAIL Gateway, are
highlighted.5. Discussion and conclusion
The SAIL system is a national architecture for e-health re-
search and evaluation, and it has been designed to operate on
a positive-sum approach [13] whereby anonymised person-level
data can be made available for research and individual privacy
can be maintained. The use of such data presents more beneﬁts,
but also more risks, than aggregated data [36]. We have used a
range of approaches in establishing the SAIL system and there
have been multiple challenges to address, many of which are
on-going. These have included DP conﬁdence in data provision,
the development of technical and procedural methods for data
management and access, having an appropriate technical and
management infrastructure, differences in quality and codingsystems between datasets, staff training and capacity, and navi-
gating the Governance frameworks. There are other ways in
which the challenges could have been addressed, but the SAIL
system has been developed through a pragmatic approach, to
create a timely solution that combines technical processes, con-
trol measures, authorisations and accountability. As a result, the
SAIL system is able to operate with the support of multiple DPs
and in compliance with Information Governance. Furthermore,
the remote access afforded by the SAIL Gateway provides conve-
nience to data users to promote research collaboration within a
secure safe haven and powerful analysis environment. Other
architectures may be possible in the future, and we are working
with collaborators to explore these in seeking continual
improvement.
The data linkage landscape is evolving rapidly, and the systems
that exist and those in development have a variety of operating
models. SAIL both compares and contrasts with aspects of various
other models, and some key examples are given here. Among the
earlier developments in data linkage research was the establish-
ment of the Oxford Medical Record Linkage System (Ox-Link).
Through this was created the Oxford Record Linkage Study, com-
prising 10 million records pertaining to 5 million people in England
between the 1960s and the 1990s. In common with SAIL, Ox-Link
was based on a repository model and it used a NHS Central Register
to provide a reliable matching standard. However, the Ox-Link pol-
icy was to comprehensively link all the records, rather than to pre-
pare them on an ad hoc basis, and this contrasts with SAIL where
linkage between datasets is not made on a wholesale basis [6].
The Western Australia data linkage system was established in the
1990s and this uses a different operating model to that of SAIL. It
Fig. 5. The SAIL Gateway data user journey. This ﬂowchart illustrates the SAIL data user journey from initial contact with SAIL to dissemination of outputs. Work conducted
within the SAIL Gateway is highlighted.
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main with the DPs and there is a database of master linkage keys to
enable records from different DPs to be linked together. As a fur-
ther contrast, the data and project-speciﬁc linkage keys are pro-
vided externally to the researcher, whereas in SAIL, analysis is
carried out within the SAIL Gateway environment [2]. Further
developments are underway to extend and enhance the data link-
age infrastructure across Australia [8].
Manitoba Health houses multiple datasets with an anonymised
population-based research registry playing a central role, and link-
ages are made when required for particular studies, similar to in
SAIL. However, unlike SAIL which uses a TTP, Manitoba Health re-
ceives the commonly-recognised identiﬁable information (name,
address, etc.), analogous to the SAIL File 1, to carry out a matching
process and assign an anonymous identiﬁer to each individual-le-
vel record. But separation is maintained and DP permission is re-
quired before the content of their administrative datasets
(analogous to SAIL File 2) are provided to be linked and used for re-
search [3]. The standard operating model of SAIL is similar to that
of Population Data BC in that data access is provided remotely and
so similar safeguards apply, such as the ability to suspend data ac-
cess if malpractice is suspected. However, there are some key dif-
ferences, for example, SAIL uses a TTP and engages in researchwhereas Population Data BC itself operates as a TTP for data link-
age and foregoes a research function [4,37]. Data linkage is well
established in Scotland and developments are underway on the
further enhancement of a ﬂexible data linkage infrastructure in
connection with the Scottish element of the Farr Institute for
Health Informatics Research [9]. This is incorporating an indexing
service, linkage agent, safe haven facilities and a one-stop to assist
researchers [5,38]. Clearly, there are already key areas of overlap
with the SAIL system, and inter-operability across the four Farr
Centres, within a proportionate Governance framework, is a key
priority.
There are a variety of effective models across the data linkage
landscape, and although they differ in operational aspects, their
common remit is to make anonymous linked administrative data
available for use by approved third parties for legitimate uses with-
in the relevant regulatory and governance frameworks. There are
many challenges to be addressed in meeting the needs of high
quality research whilst complying with Information Governance
and, as shown, these can be approached in different ways. The
over-arching governance framework for SAIL has been designed
to cover the full data life-cycle: from pre-data acquisition negotia-
tions with data providers to the release of results for publication.
However, in such a rapidly expanding ﬁeld, there will be more
Table 1
The SAIL system objectives, methods and recent developments.
Objective Methods Developments
1 Ensuring data transportation is
secure
Following data provider Information Governance permissions
and subject to a data sharing agreement, datasets are split
into a demographic component (comprising the commonly-
recognised identiﬁers), and a clinical or event component
(such as medication records and procedures). These are
transported to NWIS [13] and to SAIL, respectively, using
HTTPS (web based secure ﬁle upload via switching service, or
secure ﬁle download)
The use of secure ﬁle transfers is more robust than using
portable transfer media such as CDs or USBs, and less subject
to data mis-direction or loss
2 Operating a reliable record
matching technique to enable
accurate record linkage across
datasets
Matching and assignment of a consistent, unique ALF to each
individual is carried out by NWIS acting as a TTP so that SAIL
does not handle identiﬁable data. An ALF can be assigned to
NHS and non-NHS datasets (such as local authority housing,
or ﬁre service datasets). Similarly, a RALF has been developed
for residences in address-level datasets [14,15]
The extension of the matching and record-linkage processes
beyond healthcare data, and to include RALFs, opens up new
dimensions for research
3 Anonymising and encrypting the
data to minimise the risk of re-
identiﬁcation
Demographic data are anonymised and encrypted by the TTP
and subjected to quality assurance to ensure content
anonymity. SAIL receives only the ALF, week of birth, gender
code and area of residence (LSOA), which are then
recombined with the clinical/event component of the dataset.
Further encryption of the ALF is carried out at SAIL to form
the ALF-E. A parallel process is in place for the RALF. Linkage
across datasets is made via the ALF-E and RALF
The use of the ALF and RALF means that datasets can be
linked at the individual record and address level
(respectively), enabling a wide range of research whilst
preserving privacy
4 Applying measures to address
disclosure risk in data views
created for researchers
A variety of measures can be applied at creation of individual
data views to maximise utility and minimise disclosure risk,
including: masking of practitioner codes; aggregation and
suppression; limiting numbers of variables provided/
sequential provision; project-speciﬁc encryption of the ALF-E
to prevent cross-linkage where data users are involved in
multiple projects
Having a variety of measures ensures a ﬂexible approach.
However, the current method can be labour-intensive for a
senior analyst as the number of data users grows and more
automated methods are in development
5 Ensuring data access is controlled
and authorised
Subject to data user veriﬁcation, a data access agreement, and
physical and procedural controls, data users are assigned a
time-limited account to access their data view. Whereas
previously this was location-speciﬁc, data users are now able
to access data remotely via the SAIL Gateway. Safeguards
include a ﬁre-walled VPN, enhanced user authentication, the
use of YubiKeys, logging of all SQL commands, and
conﬁguration controls to ensure that data cannot be removed
or transferred unless authorised. Datasets and user access are
managed via SAIL Info Central
The SAIL Gateway enables greater numbers of researchers to
engage safely with SAIL, compared to the previous access
model, which was on-site only. The Gateway environment
provides users with a range of familiar tools and applications,
with secure ﬁle transfers in and out of the Gateway. SAIL Info
Central provides a centralised management system and user
interface
6 Scrutinising proposals for data
utilisation and approving output
All proposals to use SAIL data are subject to review by an
independent IGRP. In addition, some DPs request the right to
review proposals seeking to use their data, and SAIL complies
with this requirement. Output is scrutinised for potential
disclosure risk before results can be released
The lay representation on the IGRP has been increased to
enhance the patient/public viewpoint. Additional automation
in privacy-protecting measures is being developed and will
further streamline the process of output scrutiny
7 Gaining external veriﬁcation of
compliance with Information
Governance
As well as in-house monitoring, IG compliance is veriﬁed by a
regular programme of independent audit
SAIL is also working towards ISO 270001 compliance
The objectives of the SAIL system are shown, along with a brief summary of the methods in place and recent developments.
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identiﬁed the need for more automated privacy-protecting meth-
ods in data view preparation and results release. This is needful
for more efﬁcient workload management as demand for data in-
creases, and for creating more quantiﬁable risk mitigation mea-
sures. However, it is not a trivial task as the data requirements
(datasets, variables and granularities) vary depending on the re-
search questions to be addressed in a particular study, so that
one size does not ﬁt all. We also aim to extend the SAIL Gateway
to form a UK Secure Research Platform (UK SeRP). The aim of UK
SeRP is to act as a Safe Haven and analysis platform for any bone
ﬁde researcher who requires a secure data linkage environment
to work on datasets they legitimately hold. This is being taken for-
ward through our work in CIPHER [10], and will introduce new
stakeholders, DPs and requirements. As the governance and data
linkage landscape develops we will aim to continually review
and improve the SAIL system, in collaboration with data linkage
partners, to aim to stay at the cutting edge of data linkage research
for the beneﬁt of the population.Contributorship statement
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